Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Common Law Marriage in Indiana?

No such thing for Indiana.

IC 31-11-8-5
Common law marriages entered into after January 1, 1958
Sec. 5. A marriage is void if the marriage is a common law marriage that was
entered into after January 1, 1958.
As added by P.L.1-1997, SEC.3.
If I had a bit more time to indulge my historical curiosity, I think I would go looking for two cases: Stoner v. Howard Sober, Inc., , 128 Ind.App. 371 149 N.E.2d 121 (1958) and In re Sutherland's Estate, 246 Ind. 234, 204 N.E.2d 520 (1965).
No, my point today comes from reading ‘Common law marriage’ - a myth from The Harrison Drury Blog. I think this paragraph applies to Hoosiers as well as to the English:
Despite this, over 50% of people still falsely believe that cohabitants are
protected by “common law marriage”. The concept does not exist.
Maybe even more so for Hoosiers, since the British appear to be taking action to protect those living together.
The writer gives their top five tips and all are very good (and easily applicable over here in Indiana), but I like this one best as it contains a universe of good advice:
If you have any doubts about your legal position, take legal
advice to protect yourself, your partner and the children

Monday, March 30, 2009

The Downside of Practicing Family Law

Last week, I had a client comment that she was glad she did not have my job. Reading When $450 an hour isn't worth it from The Toronto Star reminded me of her comments:
"The 45-year-old mother of two decided to 'retire' from her $450-an-hour job with the highly respected firm Wilson Christen LLP after growing weary of watching couples fight to the death over everything from kids to cottages, RRSPs to religion.

'My husband said I'd reached my misery threshold,' says Morris. 'You have to be a particular kind of person to do family law because you're dealing with a lot of sadness day after day. It's hard not to have it affect you.'

The barracuda's bite wasn't lost on Morris, who colleagues considered a workaholic and a 'toughie' in the courtroom. She knows many people think of divorce lawyers as 'sharks' more intent on racking up big billings than brokering peace. But Morris is adamant she has seen very little of that.
It is just as true down here for family law. Pay attention to the attorneys who advocate collaborative family law - I notice they are not pushing this to increase their fees.

Something else I noticed that is not any different in Canada - the legislature creating more of a mess than what it solves:
Instead, she blames legislative changes 10 years ago and 'the dirty little secret you will not find in any self-help book or website' – that there is such a shortage of judges and court resources devoted to family law cases in some parts of Ontario. This is 'increasing conflict' by leaving separated couples in a horrendous sort of legal limbo, living in the same house and unable (or unwilling) to agree on division of assets and even support payments without a judge's ruling."

The article also hits on a problem I foresee if we keep pushing mediation (such as is done in Marion County) and keep playing cheap with our courts:

The system generally works well in Toronto, but largely because a two-tier system of justice has emerged out of the chaos of the family court system. Couples who can afford it have turned to mediation, arbitration and collaboration, which has helped divert thousands of divorces from the courts. But those who don't have money have opted to represent themselves – judges estimate that is now 50 to 70 per cent of all divorce litigation – which has added to court delays.

***

That has resulted in overloaded court dockets and months-long delays to appear before judges who are so overwhelmed, many openly admit they haven't had time to read the file. It is not uncommon for clients to take a day off work and spend $1,000 or more to have their lawyer just stand around in the courthouse waiting to be called before a judge who runs out of time.

County video project deadline extended

No telling if this is because no one has taken an interest or if there were other reasons. The Indiana Lawyer's County video project deadline extended has only this to say:

"The Indiana Supreme Court has extended the deadline for applications for customized versions of the 'Family Matters: Choosing to Represent Yourself in Court' video. The new deadline for counties to apply is April 10."

***

Visit http://www.in.gov/judiciary/family-court/ for more information and an application.


Madison County readers might want to give our Court Administrator a call to find out if Madison County has made an application.

Sunday, March 29, 2009

Webster Definition of Marriage Has Changed

The ABA Journal reports Webster Makes It Official: Definition of Marriage Has Changed :

According to Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, it is also defined as "the state of being united to a person of the same sex in a relationship like that of a traditional marriage," reports the Adjunct Law Prof Blog in a post today. (Others had also noted the change earlier, as a trail of hat-tips makes clear.)

***

Apparently, however, it wasn't the final holdout. The Oxford English Dictionary, regarded by some as the Bible of English word definition, this month added a secondary definition of marriage in a draft version.

Tuesday, March 24, 2009

New service helps men cope with divorce

I ran across New service helps men cope with divorce from Nodaway News Leader and thought it was interesting.

"But it’s when men have the hard time coping that society has limited resources for recovery on such a burden as divorce. Yes, there are books, and the First Baptist Divorce Care group has its doors open wide for men as well; but not every man can open up emotionally. Sometimes, what a man needs are the resources he may have lost in the divorce. And that’s where a not-so-local business comes in for men.
Akilah E. Kamaria, creator and CEO of Hemancipation, a lifestyle management company for men struggling to cope with the aftershock of divorce or separation, states, “It’s a go-to resource for men across the country who are in transition. When men are contemplating separation or hear the words ‘I want a divorce,’ I want them to take a deep breath, and then dial our number.”"

No link to Hemancipation in the article (which is a bit silly in these Internet days) and so I went off to see what I could find. When I got to the site (thank you, Google), I found this Lifestyle Management Services:
Divorce or Separated Men Support
It's not easy to figure out an individual style after years of cohabiting with a spouse. Home during separation becomes a hastily rented apartment, a friend's spare room or an unfamiliar, empty house. However, children add an element of urgency in setting up a new home. If the thought of becoming a single dad seems overwhelming, Hemancipation can help. We provide emergency support for those who are in immediate need of personal or relocation services. All services provided are strictly confidential. Call us at 888-473-0876 for immediate service.
I just do not know what I think but I pass it along as a help to anyone who might find it useful.

Monday, March 23, 2009

Important Rule Change Affecting Family Law

Attorneys and civilians both need to take a look at Supreme Court Seeks Public Comment as it Considers Clarifying What Constitutes Pro Bono Work and a Rule Change Regarding Change of Venue from The Indiana Law Blog:

"The Rules Committee is also recommending that after a final decree in dissolution of marriage and paternity cases, a party shall not be entitled to a change of judge in connection with a petition to modify, except where a legally recognized reason for a change of venue is shown."

Here is the notice and request for comments. These are due April 30, 2009.
Why the Rules Committee thinks this Rule needs changed is beyond me. Well, it is beyond a response that is polite.

As an attorney, I like this Rule for two reasons. Unlike civil suits, family law cases go on for years. Not that they are in court all that time but there may be multiple hearings over the years. Not every judge cannot help but build up some presumptions about parties that they see often. A fresh set of eyes can be a help.

My second reason comes in those cases where I am the one filing a modification and may be strictly preferential. For example, I have what is for me an out of county case and I am filing a change of judge in a modification case. The county is a small one and I just feel more comfortable with not having the current judge on the case.

I hope I have explained why the current rule has its importance. If you want to take a hand in the judicial rulemaking process, just follow the link above.

Divorce fair - Is This a Good Idea?

I am not sure what I think about Divorce fair debuts in Britain. Part of me sees this as a good thing and the conservative Hoosier thinks a bit differently:

"The fair — cheerily named the 'Starting Over Show' — takes place Sunday at a cozy hotel in the seaside resort town of Brighton. There will be live music, book signings and play areas for kids.

Organizer Suzy Miller said the event would aim to focus on the positive, starting with a warming cup of tea and a chunk of homemade cake."

***

One exhibitor called the "Shoe Queen" can organize the footwear equivalent of Tupperware parties, selling stilettos instead of rubber margarine tubs. Another plans art appreciation vacations. A dating agency promises to help those still interested in giving love a chance.

On a more pragmatic note, the fair offers mediators to help couples navigate divorce without lawyers, and debt counselors to help them avoid bankruptcy.

Wednesday, March 18, 2009

Grant County Custody

I like this Rule even if it does have technical problems:
4. Some believe that the custody of children is an award given by a Court to the best parent and, therefore, the non-custodial parent is in some way inferior and should only have limited contact with the children by way of visitation. This is not true. Most parents love their children, are truly concerned for their well-being, and are fully fit and proper parents to have custody. A court is required by law to base its difficult decision regarding custody on what it finds to be in the best interests of the children, not what is in the best interests of either parent. Parents are often unaware of the detrimental effects legal proceedings and separation from the non-custodial parent can have on the physical, emotional and psychological well-being of their children and of the need and desire children have to maintain a relationship with both parents.
Therefore, both parents in this case shall:
A. Encourage the children to have an attitude of trust and respect toward the other parent;
B. Encourage the children to have communication and a relationship with the other parent;
C. Avoid any displays of animosity toward the other parent in the presence or hearing of the children; and,
D. Avoid any questioning of the children intended to induce a child to report on the personal affairs of the other parent. [This clause does not apply if the court has determined that a parent is clearly unfit to have visitation]
What are the technical problems? Try to figure out what is the penalty for violating this Rule.

The Rule has great intentions (and its description of what makes a custody determination ought to be read by anyone wanting to understand custody in Indiana - such as those who want to change the presumption to joint custody; see my articles here, here, and here).

An Irish Annulment Case

I noticed Woman loses bid to annul four-year marriage from The Irish Independent, but had not enough to write anything on the story. Those reading my articles on annulment (if you have not read these, follow the link below this post to the archives) might recognize some of the facts as being similar to some very old Indiana cases. Some other points:

  • I think the story highlights the differences between different jurisdictions. Notice that Ireland's Constitution has a provision on marriage. Differences exist between countries and also between states. I think with people using the Internet for research (such as this blog), I need to keep pointing out that what is true in Indiana may not be true in California and vice versa.
  • On the hand, the article shows that it is not just difficult to get an Indiana annulment but to get one in Ireland, too.
Oh, yes, the article itself:
A WOMAN yesterday lost a Supreme Court bid to have her four-year marriage annulled because her husband allegedly hid huge debts and misrepresented his character before they were wed.

A psychiatrist had diagnosed the husband with a 'narcissistic personality disorder' and the woman claimed he was 'pathologically given to deception and concealment', both in his personal and financial dealings. He also drank excessively, she claimed."

***

Yesterday, Mr Justice Nicholas Kearns dismissed her appeal. He said the Constitution imposes a clear obligation on the courts to uphold the marriage contract.

It would require "much stronger evidence" to show the husband lacked the necessary capacity to enter a valid contract of marriage, the judge said.

The courts had to draw a clear distinction between conduct, on the one hand, and incapacity, on the other, he said.

The judge said while the husband engaged in "undoubtedly feckless, irresponsible and immature conduct" and turned out to be not the man the woman thought she was marrying, "one may regretfully observe that the same could be said of many marriages".

Something Different: Expensive Celebrity Divorces: Michael Jordan Tops the List at The Insider

Work has taken me away from writing for a few days. I hope no one minds this - I consider it almost frivolous - but a point to be made could be this: a prenup saved them even more in money and stress. Think about that.

10 Most Expensive Celebrity Divorces: Michael Jordan Tops the List at The Insider:


"According to the prenuptial agreement both Jordan and Juanita had signed, Juanita will be entitled to half of Michael’s fortune and the $168 million is only a third of his wealth as reports by Ace Showbiz.

Here’s the entire top 10 list courtesy of Forbes. They said they researched divorces of the last 25 years:

2. Neil Diamond and Marcia Murphey
Estimated settlement: $150 million

3. Steven Spielberg and Amy Irving
Estimated settlement: $100 million

4. Madonna and Guy Ritchie
Estimated settlement: $76 million to $92 million

5. Harrison Ford and Melissa Mathison
Estimated settlement: $85 million

6. Kevin Costner and Cindy Silva
Estimated settlement: $80 million"

Thursday, March 12, 2009

Grant County Child Support Rules - Income Withholding Rules

Oops, a couple of problems with this Rule:

2. Except for good cause shown, or pursuant to IC 31-2-10-7, income withholding orders shall be issued in all cases requiring the payment of child support, including provisional orders.
First, 31-2-10-7 no longer exists. Take a look at IC 31-16-15 for the current law on income withholding orders.

Second, I have a small problem wrapping my head around what can be good cause for not using an income withholding order (or wage assignment). See, I think they are a great convenience for my clients paying child support - they no longer need to worry about getting to the Clerk's Office before closing time. It might help to have more of a definition of good cause.

Wednesday, March 11, 2009

Henry County - Pay Atttention About Friday Hearings

I am not so sure that I like the idea of a contempt hearing where there is no record that can be easily used for an appeal, but I am also trying to think of where I have had a contempt case set for only 15 minutes. I doubt that may pro se parties would know the problem created by this sort of rule.

(E) FRIDAY HEARINGS. Hearings scheduled in provisional matters, IV-D Child Support Matters, Contempt Citation and Visitation matters set on Fridays are not recorded and are set for a maximum of 15 minutes with only the parties as witnesses. If a party desires to have the matter recorded, has additional witnesses or believes the matter will take longer than 15 minutes then a continuance should be requested and the matter set on a day other than Friday.
As an aside, it looks like Henry County has picked up an idea from Grant Count: family law Fridays.

This ends the review of the Henry County Family Law Rules.

Tuesday, March 10, 2009

Indiana Alternatives to Divorce: Legal Separation; The Grounds for Legal Separation in Indiana

I outlined the pleading requirements for legal separation in Indiana Alternatives to Divorce: Legal Separation - Pleadings. The Petition must state the grounds for the separation but only IC 31-15-3-3 gives any definition to the term grounds:

Findings required for decree
Sec. 3. Legal separation shall be decreed upon a finding by a court:
(1) that conditions in or circumstances of the marriage make it currently intolerable for both parties to live together; and
(2) that the marriage should be maintained.
As added by P.L.1-1997, SEC.7.
West Publishing places Moore v. Moore, 81 Ind.App. 169, 135 N.E. 362, (1922) as annotation for legal separation, specifically 15-3-4. I think the case more to tell us about legal separation's purpose (my emphases):
“And the court does find that owing to such constant strife between both parties as to render their living together intolerable, that under said first paragraph of complaint there should be a separation from bed and board for a limited time...."
After all where does intolerable end and irretrievable breakdown? For those who may not be aware, most Indiana divorces use the irretrievable breakdown of marriage as the grounds for the dissolution.

Yet, I think all I am showing is the weakness of our legal separation statute. I am not so sure that the parties in Moore would be filing a Petition for Dissolution today. Remember that case is approximately 87 years old and the divorce statute has changed drastically in that time.

Monday, March 9, 2009

Indiana Alternatives to Divorce: A Modern Appellate Case

While not a fraud case but annulment using bigamous marriage for its grounds, Thomas v. Smith (html format) still has something to teach us about annulments in Indiana.

First, the facts:

On January 30, 1991, Leslie and Michelle participated in a marriage ceremony in Boone County, Kentucky. However, no legal marriage actually occurred because Michelle remained married to Albert Dula until April 15, 1991, the date the divorce decree was issued. After the marriage ceremony, Michelle and Leslie acquired the Tuppence Trail property in Lawrenceburg, Indiana, but it was held in Michelle’s name alone.

They discovered the marriage was not valid in 1996 when Michelle had to produce a divorce decree in order to clear her credit record. However, neither Michelle nor Leslie thereafter attempted to enter into a valid marriage. Instead, they acted as two single persons cohabitating by filing taxes as single persons. After learning of the void marriage, they acquired another piece of real estate in June 1996 on Ventura Drive in Lawrenceburg, Indiana, which was also titled solely in Michelle’s name, and they adopted three minor children. Michelle also had a son named Joshua from her previous marriage, who was nineteen years old at the time of the final hearing.

That the wife filed the annulment case is interesting to me. Here is what the trial court did:
...On November 12, 2002, the trial court issued a decree of annulment, which awarded custody of the minor children to Leslie, provided for $169 per week in child support payments from Michelle based on her weekly income of $700, and divided Michelle and Leslie’s real and personal property. Specifically, Leslie received the Ventura Drive property, the 1983 Chevrolet pickup truck, the 1997 Mercury van, the bass boat and all funds in his 401(k) plan. Michelle received the two other parcels of real property, all cash investments, all furniture in her possession, the lawnmower, the 1987 Honda, the 1993 BMW and all funds in her 401(k) plan. The trial court also found Joshua to be emancipated because he was over eighteen years of age, not attending school, and supporting himself at the time of the hearing. Thus, the trial court did not give Michelle credit for Joshua’s support against the support payments she was ordered to make for the other three children.

Which lead the wife to file her appeal. Notice that the annulment court determined child support and custody. Since the trial court's power to determine custody and support were not contested by mother, I am not discussing these points.

What the wife did contest that deals explicitly with the topic of annulment is the division of property. The Indiana Court of Appeals describes wife's issue as "[s]pecifically, Michelle argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to divide the property because her marriage to Leslie was bigamous and therefore void."
However, those who are in bigamous relationships are not entirely without a remedy. Indiana Code section 32-17-4-1 permits parties who have never been married to file a partition action as to real property. Additionally, the trial court may equitably divide property acquired during the bigamous relationship if one of the parties requests such action. Rance, 587 N.E.2d at 152.

Similarly, we note that in accordance with Trial Rule 15(B), when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. ***

In this case, while the marriage between Michelle and Leslie was void, the division of property was litigated by the consent of the parties. Michelle not only failed to object to such a division of the property, she presented extensive evidence and arguments at the hearing and in the motion to correct error as to why she was entitled to certain assets....
At this point, somebody has to say oops as it appears that property division does not come within the authority of an annulment court. Then IC 31-11-10-4 means exactly what is says: only the procedures of the dissolution of marriage article apply to annulment cases.

Sunday, March 8, 2009

Indiana Alternatives to Divorce: Legal Separation - Pleadings

IC 31-15-3 includes the pleading requirements for a legal separation petition. IC 31-15-3-4 sets out what must be contained in the petition:

A proceeding for legal separation is commenced by the filing of a petition entitled, "In Re the legal separation of _________ and _________". The petition must:
(1) be verified; and
(2) set forth the following:
(A) The residence of each party and the length of residence in the state and county.
(B) The date of the marriage.
(C) The date on which the parties separated.
(D) The names, ages, and addresses of:
(i) any living child less than twenty-one (21) years of age; and
(ii) any incapacitated child;
of the marriage and whether the wife is pregnant.
(E) The grounds for legal separation.
(F) The relief sought.
As added by P.L.1-1997, SEC.7.

It then must be signed by the Petitioner and verified. Verified means either signed in front of a notary or using this language:
"I (we) affirm, under the penalties for perjury, that the foregoing representation(s) is (are) true. (Signed) _____________________"
And IC 31-15-3-9 sets out what must be in the Legal Separation Decree.

Now let us look at what might be the weakness of our legal separation statue. Like all family law statutes, the legal separation statute does not require a responsive pleading:
IC 31-15-3-8
Responsive pleading or counter petition
Sec. 8. A responsive pleading or a counter petition may be filed under this chapter.
As added by P.L.1-1997, SEC.7.
Case law tells us that a petition for legal separation can convert to a petition for dissolution of marriage. The following comes from Richey v. Richey, 128 Ind.App. 503 at 505 and 508-09, 149 N.E.2d 126 (1958):
Appellee's complaint averred, in substance, the parties were married on the 24th day of May, 1936 and lived together as husband and wife until the 15th day of February, 1956, on which day they separated and have not since said date lived or cohabited together; that three children were born to said marriage, and she is a fit and proper person to have their custody and desires same. It is then specifically averred that ‘prior to their separation, defendant was guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment of plaintiff, by reason of which it has become impossible for plaintiff and defendant to live together as husband and wife; that plaintiff has been a bona fide resident of the State of Indiana for more than one year last past, and of the County of Ripley for more than six months last past, and for six years last past has resided at 419 North Buckeye Street, Osgood, Ripley County, Indiana; that she is by occupation a housewife.'

Prayer that she be divorced from bed and board from appellant, that she be awarded custody of the children and that appellant be required to pay a reasonable sum at reasonable intervals for the support of herself and children during said separation and for attorney fees, etc.

On May 9, 1956 appellee filed an amended complaint for absolute divorce. The only amendment to this pleading was in the prayer, which asked that the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties be dissolved, and that she be granted an absolute divorce from appellant. It then asked for custody of the children, support, attorney fees, etc., as did the original complaint. The original and the amended complaint had appended thereto the following affidavit:

****

However, in this case there is another and more important reason why appellant's contention cannot be sustained. We have heretofore indicated the difference in the phraseology of the statutes relating to separation from bed and board and for absolute divorce. Both the original and the amended complaints, in averring the grounds for separation and the grounds for absolute divorce, assert verbatim the fourth ground of the divorce statute. As hereinbefore set out, the only difference in the two complaints is contained in the prayer. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the prayer of a complaint does not determine its character or theory. It is the substantial facts that are controlling. Houck v. Graham, 1886, 106 Ind. 195, 202, 6 N.E. 594; Burk v. Brown, 1915, 58 Ind.App. 410, 417, 108 N.E. 252; Loftin v. Johnson, 1940, 216 Ind. 537, 542, 24 N.E.2d 916; Grider v. Titus, 1948, 118 Ind.App. 473, 476, 80 N.E.2d 570 (Transfer denied).
It appears that one can convert a Petition for Legal Separation into a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage by mere pleading. While I have serious doubts that this precise discussion in Richey remains good law even though it remains in place under West's Annotated Indiana Code, it leaves open the possibility of a counter petition (or an amended petition ) that is one for dissolution.

I thin the ability to file a counter-petition for dissolution of marriage is supported by two other of our legal separation statutes.

In IC 31-15-3-9(3), the Decree must state that "neither party has filed a petition or counter petition for dissolution of marriage under IC 31-15-2...." Which says to me that if either party files a petition for dissolution, there can be no legal separation decree. After all IC 31-15-3-5 bars the filing of a legal separation petition if there is a pending divorce case:
A proceeding may not be commenced under section 4 of this chapter if:
(1) an action for dissolution of marriage filed under IC 31-15-2-4 (or IC 31-1-11.5-3(a) before its repeal) is pending; or
(2) a provisional order or decree based on a petition for dissolution of marriage filed under IC 31-15-2-4 (or IC 31-1-11.5-3(a) before its repeal) has been granted.
Therefore, a dissolution of marriage petition trumps a legal separation petition. I think if the opposing party files a counter-petition for dissolution, then the legal separation case ends.

Why do I think the Richey discussion currently describes the current relationship between pleading a legal separation case and a dissolution of marriage case? Because of the following statute:

IC 31-15-2-3
Grounds for decree
Sec. 3. Dissolution of marriage shall be decreed upon a finding by a court of one (1) of the following grounds and no other ground:
(1) Irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.
(2) The conviction of either of the parties, subsequent to the marriage, of a felony.
(3) Impotence, existing at the time of the marriage.
(4) Incurable insanity of either party for a period of at least two (2) years.
As added by P.L.1-1997, SEC.7.
I am going to discuss the grounds for legal separation in another post but I think this suffices to explain my questioning of Richey.

Take a look at Indiana Alternatives to Divorce: Legal Separation; The Grounds for Legal Separation in Indiana where I discuss the grounds for legal separation.

Saturday, March 7, 2009

Indiana Child Support : Repudiating a Parent

Generally, I like to breakdown an appellate opinion. On the other hand, I do not think I can add anything to this from Redd v. Redd (pdf version from the Indiana Court of Appeals):

“Repudiation of a parent is “a complete refusal to participate in a relationship with his or her parent.” Norris v. Pethe, 833 N.E.2d 1024, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (html version here). Under certain circumstances, repudiation will obviate a parent‟s obligation to pay certain expenses for the child, including college expenses. Id. “[W]here a child, as an adult over eighteen years of age, repudiates a parent, that parent must be allowed to dictate what effect this will have on his or her contribution to college expenses for that child.” . Id. at 167 (quotation omitted)....
Short and to the point and not much more that can be said about it. In a different context - say, child custody or parenting time - I might want to bring up parental alienation syndrome. Here, the parent bringing the child support modification petition is the parent who may be the victim of parental alienation syndrome.

Indiana Alternatives to Divorce: Annulment Meets Divorce

In Mason v. Mason (html format), the Indiana Court of Appeals dealt with a case where the husband claimed the trial court ought to have annulled the marriage. The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the dissolution over the annulment.

I read the following as the important facts of the case:

On January 10, 2000, John filed for an annulment on grounds that his marriage to Bonnie was void under Indiana Code section 31-11-8-3, which prohibits marriage between first cousins unless such cousins are at least sixty-five years old on the date of the marriage. On March 23, 2000, Bonnie filed an Answer to John’s complaint and a Counterclaim, seeking dissolution of her marriage to John on the grounds that the marriage was irretrievably broken. On November 2, 2000, John was deposed, and the deposition was filed with the trial court on December 5, 2000. After several delays, a bench trial was set for January 11, 2002. John’s attorney, with court permission, withdrew his appearance on November 12, 2001. On January 11, 2002, Bonnie appeared with counsel, but John was absent. Bonnie’s counsel orally moved to dismiss John’s complaint for failure to prosecute. The trial court granted the motion because of John’s absence. The trial court found that the Masons’ marriage was valid under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, See footnote granted Bonnie’s request for dissolution, and awarded her all the marital property including the four life insurance policies. The trial court also awarded Bonnie attorney’s fees. John now appeals.
Because the annulment petition depended on the parties being first cousins, the annulment issued turned on the validity of the Tennessee marriage:
In this case, both parties admit to being first cousins. Appellant’s App. p. 5, 22. They also concede that they were married in Tennessee and that Tennessee allows first cousins to marry. Appellant’s App. p. 70, 181. Additionally, no statute such as Indiana Code section 31-11-1-1(b) See footnote exists to establish that a marriage such as John and Bonnie’s violates Indiana’s public policy. As a matter of comity, Indiana can choose to recognize Tennessee marriages between first cousins, even though such a marriage could not be validly contracted between residents of Indiana. Thus, the trial court committed no error in recognizing John and Bonnie’s marriage as valid.

Which in turn supported the trial judge's decision to dismiss the annulment petition. Thus, the wife's dissolution petition was heard and the trial court's decision to do so was upheld on appeal.

The opinion has only one other point that has anything to do with annulment:
In reviewing John’s claim, we first note that this court has held that if a marriage is void, then the trial court lacks jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees. Rance v. Rance, 587 N.E.2d 150, 153-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). As stated above, however, John and Bonnie’s marriage is considered valid in Indiana. Thus, the trial court could properly consider Bonnie’s request for an award of attorney’s fees with regard to her counterclaim for dissolution....

Friday, March 6, 2009

Indiana Decision: Divorce and Bankruptcy

From The Indiana Lawyer comes Judges disagree on if remand is necessary:

"The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a trial court's grant of an ex-wife's petition for additional relief for funds, finding the trial court didn't hear evidence on certain 'critical' factors. The judges on appeal didn't agree as to whether the case should be remanded."

***

In Harold E. Bean Jr. v. Carol A. Bean, No. 49A05-0807-CV-390, the appellate court considered whether the trial court properly adjudicated certain of Harold Bean's dissolution debts to be nondischargeable for the purpose of the federal bankruptcy proceedings; whether the trial court erred in ordering him to pay half of the Beans' children's college expenses; and whether it erred in ordering Harold to pay Carol Bean's attorney fees.

***

When considering whether Harold's dissolution debts, such as the second mortgage and tax liability were nondischargeable, the Indiana Court of Appeals noted important evidence on certain factors was missing. The record didn't contain evidence of their incomes and earning potentials when they entered the settlement agreement, and neither party presented evidence about the actual need for support or the adequacy of support without the award, wrote Judge Elaine Brown.

Without a record of the parties' financial situations when they entered into the settlement agreement, the Court of Appeals was unable to tell whether the second mortgage assigned to Harold was intended to be in nature of maintenance or support or part of a property division, which would determine whether the debts were nondischargeable. The appellate court reversed the award reimbursing Carol for her payment of the second mortgage and payment of the tax liability.

This raises a couple of points: 1) a reminder that evidence is what matters when one gets into court; 2) that Indiana trial courts share jurisdiction with the federal Bankruptcy Court in determining dischargeability of debt; and 3) not all debts are dischargeable in bankruptcy and the creditor ex-spouse needs to be consult their attorney as soon as they get a Notice of Bankruptcy.

Alternatives to Divorce: Legal Separation in Indiana

The Indiana statutes for legal separation are found in IC 31-15-3. Doing some background research for this series, I checked out West's Annotated Statutes to see what case law exists. As usual with the West annotations, they do need a close look to make sure how much they match up with the statute. Today, I am going to give just an overview of the cases. I have other posts that will detail the cases. Let me say no much case law exists.

  • West notes two cases under IC 31-15-3-4: Sachs v. Sachs, 97 Ind.App. 224, 185 N.E. 291 (1933), and Richey v. Richey, 128 Ind.App. 503, 149 N.E.2d 126 (1958).
  • Under 15-3-6, I found Sachs again and Horlander v. Horlander, , 579 N.E.2d 91, (IndApp. 1991), rehearing denied, transfer denied (and which has nothing substantive to say about legal separation).
  • For 15-3-9: Shafer v. Shafer, 219 Ind. 97, 37 N.E.2d 69 (1941).
It also appears that 15-4-1 applies and Stanley v. Stanley, 190 Ind. 528, 131 N.E. 35 (1921) and Scott v. Scott, 17 Ind. 309 (1861) will apply to legal separation.

Notice the ages on these cases. These remain good cases - the appellate courts have not overturned them. However, I think everyone will see two things as we go along: 1) the case law comes out of a different family law context than exists now and 2) that there are reasons why these cases remain good law because of this changed family law context.

Thursday, March 5, 2009

Paternity: Supervising Child Custody and Parenting Time

Indiana's divorce statutes do not give to the trial court the power to supervise the carrying out of custody and/or parenting time of the Decree of Dissolution. Yet, Indiana the paternity court gives the power to do exactly this in IC 31-14-13-5:
The court may order the probation department or any licensed child placing agency to supervise the placement to ensure that the custodial or parenting time terms of the decree are carried out if:
(1) both parents or the child request supervision; or
(2) the court finds that without supervision the child's physical health and well-being would be endangered or the child's emotional development would be significantly impaired.
A tool unused so far as my experience goes. So far no case law noted for this statute.

This tool could also be quite useful on the divorce side.

Thoughts on Presuming Joint Custody Part 3 (Problems and Solutions)

You will find Thoughts on Presuming Joint Custody Part 1 (Introduction) here and Thoughts on Presuming Joint Custody Part 2 (Mothers and Fathers) here.

I have gone on at this length because I think this issue over a presumption of evidence (and that is what is at issue with the proposed change in the law) actually signals bigger problems. Consider this from Sometimes the Deadbeat Dad is a Mom:

How can we use this information to help reduce the “deadbeat” category altogether? The answer may lie in the concept of joint custody and visitation. Statistics show that when non-custodial parents are more involved in their children’s lives through joint custody and visitation arrangements, they pay all or some of their support obligation nearly 85% of the time. Non-custodial parents who do not share custody or visitation pay support less than 62% of the time. Absent circumstances of actual domestic violence, drug abuse or other such “red flags” where joint custody and visitation may not be appropriate, the custodial parent would be well-advised to encourage the non-custodial parent to be as involved with the children as possible. In such a scenario, the custodial parent would benefit, the non-custodial parent would benefit, and most importantly, the children will benefit. Where else in this economy will you be offered the opportunity to engage in a win-win-win situation?
Notice the "and visitation" used above. In response to a comment to a related article, I mentioned that non-custodial parents need to use and to enforce their rights and that included visitation/parenting time. That includes not only the actual visitation rights such as the right of first refusal but also the more informational rules of parenting time.

What we need in Indiana is more information. It may surprise some that our courts do not have records telling us how many joint custody orders get modified to sole custody, or sole custody modified to joint custody, or why those changes are made, or the relationship between those paying support and type of custody order or their visitation habits. Frankly, I could add a lot more to that list but it is enough of a run on sentence as is. This article helped take away the bias my experience has given me towards joint custody.

Interesting Article on Joint Custody - Ottawa Divorce .com Forums gives us arguments for joint custody but it did a bit more for me, too. This article comes from an online forum. For some reason known only to computers the text is too bad for quoting intelligibly. From what I can tell the Canadian proposal did not pass - even though the proponent made the same arguments we are seeing in Indiana. Here is where my inchoate thoughts about the problems being cultural started to take shape. I suggest reading the whole thread on this topic.

I mentioned in Part 1 The Women’s Law Project's testimony at a Hearing Before the Pennsylvania House Judiciary Committee (pdf format) on August 24, 2004 (a copy of the proposed Pennsylvania law is here). The Law Project opposed the change in Pennsylvania law to a presumption of joint custody. Here is the argument that took me away from any leaning to a change in Indiana:
Proponents of joint custody presumptions assert that joint custody benefits both the children and the parents by increasing contact with both parents. While this argument is appealing on the surface and may prove correct in a situation where both parents voluntarily and wholeheartedly commit to a joint custody arrangement, it fails to take into account the all too common post-separation parental relationship that is characterized by acrimony and/or minimal communication. In his essay on the subject of joint custody, Judge Hardcastle, a Nevada Family Court Judge, expressed concern that the presumption of joint custody deters judges from their fundamental obligation to determine the “best interests of the child.”1 He believes that such presumptions pressure judges to order joint custody without carefully and thoroughly examining and considering the facts of the cases before them, increasing the likelihood that joint custody will be ordered in inappropriate cases involving hostile and conflicted parties. (footnote: Gerald W. Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge’s Perspective, 32 Fam. L.Q. 201, 206 (1998).)

Joint custody requires an enormous amount of effort and determination on the part of parents. When joint legal and physical custody is involved, parents must create two homes fully equipped for themselves and their children, coordinate complicated schedules, and work with each other to make both short-term and long-term decisions involving the children. Significant effort must be made so that children who shift back and forth between two parental residences are not unduly stressed by the arrangement. This is not easy for parents who are not living together and especially for parents who have never lived and parented together. Cooperation and communication are essential to the success of a joint custody arrangement; such an arrangement is incompatible with parents in conflict.
I cannot disagree with either paragraph. I think the idea that we can force people into a joint custody situation that will work to benefit the children is foolish at best. At worst, it has the only benefit of fomenting more acrimonious litigation.

Which brings me to point another topic that I discuss fairly often - collaborative divorce. I do not maintain a separate archive for these articles but they can be found by using the search engines on this blog. The concept takes out the adversarial from a divorce proceeding. I would love to see how many collaborative divorces with children have joint custody and how successful are those joint custody arrangements. I have a sneaky suspicion that joint custody is preferred by people using collaborative divorce methods and their joint custody arrangements are successful.

I think the greatest hurdle for collaborative divorce remains the clients. If clients understand that turning every divorce into a no-holds barred fight to the finish is not always in their best interests, then the lawyers will follow suit. As a lawyer, I can say that most of us will work to settle a case. Others will not return a call or speak to opposing counsel outside of the courtroom. Clients get impressed with the second type of lawyer so long as they realize that their legal fees go up with courtroom appearances and their success rate goes down. After all, aren't lawyers supposed to go to court? No. We are supposed to go to court only if it serves our client's best interests and there can be no compromise. For an example: there can be no compromise if it means sending a child to live with a drug addled mother but figuring out child support arrears ought to be one the parties can settle. Another example: if the parents could agree on a custody arrangement that does benefit all, then the lawyers need to not get in the way of the agreement. They should do so even if it means a loss of fees.

The Law Project testimony pointed out to me that this type of legislation does nothing to deter those wanting to litigate for the sake of litigating:
A presumption of joint custody is simply inappropriate in a custody case. A presumption is not probative; rather, it merely supplies the fact-finder with a conclusion when there is no proof to the contrary.28 Thus, a presumption of joint custody automatically establishes a conclusion that joint custody is appropriate without any information that supports that conclusion and shifts the burden of proof to the party seeking to prove that joint custody is inappropriate.

Presumptions and the resulting shift in burdens are generally created for four principal reasons. First, some presumptions are created because of a natural tendency to burden the party desiring change and/or to correct any imbalance created by one party having better access to the proof. Second, special economic or social policies, more often implicit than outspoken, incline courts to favor one premise by assigning it the advantage of a presumption. Third, out of convenience, a presumption may be created to avoid animpasse or standstill and reach a result regardless of whether or not the result is arbitrary or capricious. Fourth, a presumption may be based on a judicial estimate of the probabilities – that proof of one fact makes the inference of the existence of another fact so probable that it saves time and makes more sense to assume the truth of the second fact until the adversary disproves it.29
26 Barry, supra note 22, at 769-71.
27 Id. at 771-72.
28 See 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2491 (Chadbourn rev. 1981); see also Turner v. Turner, 455 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (La. 1984).
29 John W. Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence § 337 at 415, § 343 at 437-38 (5th ed. 1999); C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence 806-07 (2d ed. 1972); see also Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A. 2d 1377, 1381 (D.C. 1978) (citing McCormick)

Sorry about keeping the footnotes but I think they are necessary. Yes, I added the emphasis. Those who think joint custody should be presumed need to explain how this presumption fits into any of these four categories. If it does not, then why are they wanting the presumption? Unless the presumption fits into one our categories of evidentiary law, it will be either unused or misused by the courts. (Which depends on one's perspective to the case in question).

I emphasized part of that quote as it was that sentence where I saw the potential for litigation. Bringing this back to examples: mother is a drug addict but has no convictions and proof is elusive (one of those we know but just cannot prove it), she should be presumed to have joint custody? Therein lies one truth I wish more people would get through their heads: the law can cut both ways. A person may have had a bad divorce, did not get custody of their children and may think a change in the law would have benefited his case. That person may be correct but he does not know of the case where the change benefits a person who does not deserve the benefit.

The Women's Law Project makes another point that applies directly to the proposed changes in Indiana law:
In practice, joint custody can refer to several different types of arrangements. It can include both legal custody (decision-making) and physical custody (living arrangements, daily care and supervision) or it can include only joint legal custody with the child living with one parent. In reality, the latter situation is more typical. In those cases, one parent has primary physical custody but is severely restricted in making significant decisions by the requirement of collaboration. The parent with only shared legal custody retains privileges without the responsibility of day-to-day care. The fallout from such an arrangement is complex and burdensome. Basic decisions, such as selection of the child’s physician or therapist, become the subject of extensive wrangling and manipulation between the noncooperative parents. Even medical emergencies become traumatic, with horror stories of surgeons unable to operate without the consent of both parents.
I omitted the footnotes here. The point is that joint custody means different things to different people. The statute provides no definition of what is joint custody: joint custody but one parent has physical custody or does it mean sharing the children on an equal time share basis?

I apologize for the extreme length but I think we need to take a look at what is going on here. I do not think changing our law to presume joint custody as being in the best interests of the children is a good thing. I do have some suggestions that might be better - at least for a discussion.

Here are the things I think need changing:
  1. Stop presuming the adversarial system is the best solution for child custody matters. It works for civil cases involving money, but money does not face the same post-judgment issues as do children. This will require involvement from the Bar, the Bench, the public and some from the legislature for any change. Yes, it means giving collaborative law a boost in this state.
  2. Provide alternative means to litigation. Not just mediation, but give to the party with the lesser income the ability to forego the upfront costs of mediation. When each party must bear the costs of mediation equally, this creates a hardship for the spouse with lesser income and an advantage to the other spouse.
  3. Provide adequate funding for guardians ad litem. Better yet, give the counties money for expanding the GAL program and give the GAL the ability to get psychological and custodial evaluations, to get the kind of evidence that might actually help the court to make a decision.
  4. Require parenting classes. Not just the seminars required by some courts but actual classes with actual tests. Do not pass, no custody.
  5. Attorney fees for custody cases. Madison County courts rarely award fees in custody cases. I suspect this is true in most counties. Perhaps more importantly, do not award them if the case is frivolous. I have in mind a case pending where the opposing party has no income and their case is weak at best.
  6. Educate the public on their rights. Probably the hardest thing but the most important. The general public needs to want to learn. Too many think there are generic answers when there is no such thing. (On the other hand, I will admit lawyers exist who mystify the simple). The Indiana Supreme Court has made a great effort to provide information to the general public online. It would be a good thing if the general public read what is freely available to them. Statutes, Parenting Time Guidelines, Child Support Guidelines are like instructions for handling your case. Of course, if you are a person who puts together Christmas toys without reading the instructions first then this may be a good suggestion.

Annulment vs. Divorce: Tax Issues

The Mainstreet site has an article that poses a different perspective on the annulment versus divorce argument but Annulment vs. Divorce: The Financial Differences skirts an important issue about annulment and has deserves an important qualification in Indiana.

The following paragraph has a general application to Indiana:

When a marriage is annulled, the courts usually try to restore each party to his or her original financial state before the marriage occurred. This means that what you brought to the marriage you will usually take away from a marriage. If a couple has accumulated some shared assets prior to an annulment, it can get a little more complicated. The division of these assets is usually handled as if two strangers bought property together. When children are involved, child support and custody agreements are handled just like a divorce."
However, see Thomas v. Smith (html format) for an exception to this general rule.

Here is the twist:
If you are the financially weaker partner, it may be in your best interest to file for a divorce. If, on the other hand, you have substantial assets and can prove that your marriage should never have occurred, filing for an annulment can save you a lot of dough (particularly in spousal support). An annulment can also help one partner avoid liability for another partner’s significant debt. Talk to a divorce attorney about the specific circumstances of your marriage to find out which of these options will work best for you.

Yes, there could be tax issues. Which for me, raises the specter of collusive annulment filings. Or a lot of people storming law offices wanting to annul their marriages because the article does not mention clearly that the grounds for annulment and divorce can differ.

Remember that in Indiana, there are specific grounds for annulment and these need to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. (For more on Indiana annulments, just click on the annulment link below).

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

Henry County: Who Prepares the Decree of Dissolution

I suspect many will find themselves either puzzled or amused by this local rule. One might think the judges over in New Castle do not have much to do, but let me say this rule is neither a waste of time nor as silly as it might appear:

(D) DECREE PREPARED SUBSEQUENT TO HEARING. A decree prepared following a hearing at the direction of the court shall be prepared by Counsel for the Petitioner and submitted to counsel for the Respondent who shall both sign the Decree “Approved as to Form.”
I might even say this local rule epitomizes a local rule: somewhat of a detail that the Indiana Supreme Court would leave out of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure but instead leaves to local discretion,

What is so good about this Rule? I see two good things, but it will take some words to explain its utility.

The first and most simplest thing giving the Rule utility is that it means Respondent's lawyer gets to make sure that Petitioner's lawyer neither omitted nor added anything to the court's decision. More often than not, the trial judge makes an oral decision from the bench and the lawyers are left to writing down what the judge says. I would think everyone can see where errors can creep into a Decree with that sort of situation. (These problems are less so now that we have everything recorded and the recording are pretty easy to access).

My second reason for liking this Rule requires me to report on a case from last Fall from Anderson. It was an enforcement hearing and opposing counsel was an older local attorney. A deed went unprepared, the Decree was vague on who was to prepare, and opposing counsel argued that it was customary that my side was to prepare the deed. After twenty-one years of practicing in Madison County, this was the first time that I had ever heard of this custom. The judge agreed with me. With a similar rule here as this Henry County Rule, there would have been no delay in preparing the document, no additional attorney fees, no additional hearing due to an ambiguity in who was to prepare a document.

It does leave me to speculate about what happens when neither side has a lawyer.

Thoughts on Presuming Joint Custody Part 2 (Mothers and Fathers)

Thoughts on Presuming Joint Custody Part 1 is here.

I had a client many years ago say that she wanted custody and here is her answer when I asked what was wrong with the husband as a father: nothing, he is a great father. The court ordered joint custody. Later, during my sojourn in Indianapolis, she filed a modification because a problem had arisen since the divorce - the new step-mother was causing problems. I do not recall hearing what became of that case.

If you are a man, ask yourself what evidence there was to support either side for sole custody. What evidence was there supporting that you and the wife could cooperate in caring for the children? (And for the person who commenting earlier - you might ask yourself if you were asked these questions by your lawyer.)

Let me say that there are women who should not have custody of their children. Some women have the grit to understand this and act accordingly. I use grit because of what I think is another cultural issue: we expect women to have custody of their children. Reader, think of what you think of women who do not have custody of their children. By the way, if you are a man advocating this joint custody presumption and your first thought of a woman without custody of her children is a bad thought, I suggest you think hard about why this is so. I am in the midst of a second round of a custody case where I got custody for the father and mother filed a petition to modify only a few months after I won the first case.

Here is part of a Divorce Decree where I got custody for the father:

3. Although both parents love their children, MOTHER's life remains unsettled and chaotic, while FATHER is in a stable relationship with a responsible and mature adult who serves as an appropriate step-mother for the children. While both parents work full-time, FATHER has arranged his schedule so that he is available every evening and on weekends. FATHER's support system is best suited to meet the children's needs and to provide stability for them. The children have made significant improvements in their behavior, adjustment, and education since they have been in FATHER's care.
I think the judge here sets out a very good description of the meaning of best interests of the child. I think that paragraph can be read just as well by substituting mother for father. I do not want to retail the evidence in either of my cases - that would take far too much time and space. I do want to note they had two similar characteristics: men who put the children before themselves and mothers with very poor lifestyle choices. In both cases, the mother's witnesses had the same line: the children should be with their mother because their mother loved them. I do not doubt the mothers love their children, but love is not all that is meant by the children's best interests. I think we all know of people who loved but have loved neither wisely nor well.

Part Three will be up tomorrow.

Collecting Child Support: Prejudgment Interest

What is prejudgment interest? Indiana law allows for interest on a judgment and some times for judgment for the period preceding judgment. Why is this so? Think about the time that person A denies person B money owed to them. Why should person B not get some compensation for their time spent waiting for their money?

The law leaves to the trial court's discretion to add prejudgment interest to the judgment for child support. The specific statute is IC 31-16-12-2

The court may, upon a request by the person or agency entitled to receive child support payments, order interest charges of not more than one and one-half percent (1 1/2%) per month to be paid on any delinquent child support payment. The person or agency may apply for interest if support payments are not made in accordance with the support order. Accrued interest charges may be collected in the same manner as support payments under IC 31-16-9.
As added by P.L.1-1997, SEC.8.
That 1.5 % per month comes to 18% per year. Think about that for a minute: $18.00 dollars added yearly on every $100.00 owed or $180.00 for every thousand dollars.

McGuire v. McGuire, 880 N.E.2d 297 (Ind.App. 2008) gives some definition to a trial court's discretion:
First, although [petitioner's] delay in raising the issue of child support arrearage does not bar her claim, the court may properly consider the delay when making the discretionary decision whether to award prejudgment interest. In fact, Ind.Code § 31-51-4-8(b) provides that “the court shall exclude from the period in which prejudgment interest accrues any period of delay that the court determines is caused by the party petitioning for prejudgment interest.” The trial court certainly could deny prejudgment interest based on [petitioner's] acquiescence in [respondent's] proportional reductions and her delay in seeking enforcement.Whited, 859 N.E.2d at 664-65.

Mother waited nearly ten years from Daughter's emancipation to file an action regarding Father's arrearage. It appears Father had not paid child support for a number of years prior to Daughter's emancipation. Accordingly, we cannot find the court abused its discretion by concluding prejudgment interest was inappropriate based on the number of years Mother acquiesced in Father's failure to pay. See id.4.

Those thinking about waiting to collect child support would do well to think on that last paragraph I just quoted.

As a practical matter, I have not asked for prejudgment interest and I have never seen anyone ask for prejudgment interest. I say practical matter because the problem is one of practicality: the hard cases for collecting child support will not be fazed by having prejudgment interest added to the child support orders.

On the other hand, I think judgment interest may be more of a impetus for getting delinquent child support payments made more timely.

Tuesday, March 3, 2009

Thoughts on Presuming Joint Custody Part 1 (Introduction)

For those just coming in, the General Assembly had a bill proposing a change in our custody statute to a presumption of joint custody. My other articles about this are: New Indiana Legislation: New Joint Custody Bill, Following up on New Indiana Legislation: New Joint Custody Bill, and More News On New Indiana Joint Custody Bill (HB 1044).

The actually created some comments on this blog but far fewer than I thought likely. I suppose that is a good antidote to any thoughts about the impact of blogging. Still, I am disappointed. This is an important issue - even if it is framed in the context of evidence law.

Let me state my position quite baldly: the legislation as proposed is not a good idea. from the very first I had a bias against joint custody. From my experience, I have rarely seen joint custody work as advertised. Here are the scenarios where I have seen joint custody fail:

  • Husbands using the threat of a custody fight with all its expenses to get joint custody and the wives agreeing to it because they could not afford the fight and just wanted the divorce over.
  • The parties agreeing to joint custody - or the court ordering it in one case - and then the parties cannot cooperate in their care of the children.
Rare is the case where the parents can continue to cooperate after the divorce but those successful joint custody cases are exactly those where they can cooperate. Where the parents have maturity and the ability to get past their resentments towards their former spouses in favor of their children, joint custody works.

However, I thought that the possibility of joint custody might make parents less inclined to the kind of behavior that makes some custody fights necessary. Then I found the articles that follow. They reinforce my view that whatever resentments are felt by some non-custodial parents, creating a presumption of joint custody will not change those resentments into something more mellow. Nor do I think that this will end child custody litigation but will change the focus of the custody litigation to rebutting the presumption.

I want everyone to read to the testimony presented by the The Women’s Law Project to the Pennsylvania legislature. I know that this will draw the ire of many men but their testimony includes too many studies, too much empirical evidence to be dismissed out of hand without incurring a serious question about motives. Is the desire for a presumption favoring joint custody meant to better lives for children or something to assuage some other feelings that are not so pleasant to consider in print?

I believe I have said this before on this blog, but many reasons exist why men do get custody of their children. Some men do want custody for a range of reasons from the selfish to the altruistic. Some men ought never have custody of their children. Some men should have custody but do not force the issue.

Take a look at that preceding paragraph and substitute women for men. I think that it will sound strange to most if you substitute women for men. I think this problem is what the proposed change is supposed to fix by sidestepping the whole issue. Which leads me to the final reason why I think the law takes the wrong track to a solution. I think the reason anyone finds substituting women for men is cultural and the law just will not fix that problem. Because we think of women as mothers and mothers as nurturing and children need nurturing, mothers will generally be thought of serving the children's best interests.

That the law does not presume mothers as being in the best interests of the children is not always clear to men. I get told constantly that Indiana courts will not give custody to fathers. This is not true but the idea infects clients. I think it may infect lawyers, too. That thought came to me from one of the comments to an earlier post on this issue. Getting custody for a father may take more work - how much work depends on each case and is impossible to discuss in the abstract - but why it takes any work depends on how the parents have divvied up their parental duties. If the father never changed a diaper, never did the midnight feedings, or any of anything similar then I am going to question him closely about why he wants custody. Again, ask yourself why parents should divide parental duties and I think we return to a cultural answer: this is what women do and this is what men do.

Since we are talking about litigation, we need to talk about evidence. The true questions to be asked are these: what evidence does the father have that it is in the child's best interests for him to have custody and what evidence is their that mother serves the child's best interests? The answers to these questions are the starting points in a child custody case.

I will have Part Two tomorrow and Part Three on Thursday.

Child Support and Emancipation in Indiana - Child Removes Themselves from Parental Control

When does child end in Indiana is still a frequent question. I have left the simple answer here.

A bit more complicated is what happens when a child puts themselves outside of parental control.

First, while many lawyers (and I must include myself here) use the shorthand of "emancipation" to describe what occurs under IC 31-16-6-6(a). The statute indicates something different - termination of support instead of emancipation:

(a) The duty to support a child under this chapter ceases when the child becomes twenty-one (21) years of age unless any of the following conditions occurs:
(1) The child is emancipated before becoming twenty-one (21) years of age. In this case the child support, except for the educational needs outlined in section 2(a)(1) of this chapter, terminates at the time of emancipation, although an order for educational needs may continue in effect until further order of the court.
(2) The child is incapacitated. In this case the child support continues during the incapacity or until further order of the court.
(3) The child:
(A) is at least eighteen (18) years of age;
(B) has not attended a secondary school or postsecondary educational institution for the prior four (4) months and is not enrolled in a secondary school or postsecondary educational institution; and
(C) is or is capable of supporting himself or herself through employment.
In this case the child support terminates upon the court's finding that the conditions prescribed in this subdivision exist. However, if the court finds that the conditions set forth in clauses (A) through (C) are met but that the child is only partially supporting or is capable of only partially supporting himself or herself, the court may order that support be modified instead of terminated.
What is meant by this statute is the end of the non-custodial parent's obligation to pay child support. At this point,I suggest reading Carpenter v. Carpenter, 891 N.E.2d 587, 593 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (the PDF version from the Indiana Court of Appeals is here and at pages 6 -10)., First, while many lawyers (and I must include myself here) use the shorthand of "emancipation" to describe what occurs under I.C. 31-16-6-6. What is meant is the end of the non-custodial parent's obligation to pay child support.

For emancipation proper look at IC 31-16-6-6(b)(3):
(b) For purposes of determining if a child is emancipated under subsection (a)(1), if the court finds that the child:
(1) has joined the United States armed services;
(2) has married; or
(3) is not under the care or control of:
(A) either parent; or
(B) an individual or agency approved by the court;
the court shall find the child emancipated and terminate the child support.
What if the child removes themselves from the control of either parent? On February 19, 2009, the Indiana Court of Appeals published its opinion in Redd v. Redd (pdf version from the Indiana Court of Appeals) which says in part this about (b)(3):
It is well-settled that “emancipation requires that (1) the child initiate the action putting itself outside the parents‟ control and (2) the child in fact be self-supporting.” Dunson, 769 N.E.2d at 1123-24 (“[S]ubsection (b)(3) requires that the child must in fact be supporting itself to be emancipated. The idea that children must be supporting themselves to be emancipated has been a part of Indiana case law since at least 1952.”) (emphasis added). Moreover, “„[t]o determine whether a child has placed herself beyond the control, custody and care of either parent, we consider whether the child is in fact supporting [himself] without the assistance of her parents.‟” Id. at 1125 (quoting Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ind. 1996)). Finally, section 31-16-6-6(a) “does not deal with „emancipation‟ of a child; it merely identifies the circumstances under which our legislature has determined a parent‟s obligation to pay child support should terminate.” Carpenter v. Carpenter, 891 N.E.2d 587, 593 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
The Court of Appeals then held that under the following facts, there was no emancipation:
In this case, J.R. has not joined the military and is unmarried; therefore, we consider whether he is “under the care or control of either parent.” J.R. resides with Father and no evidence presented establishes that J.R. is supporting himself. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court‟s finding that J.R. is emancipated is not supported by the evidence.
The Redd case has only these facts about J.R.:
J.R. began to reside with Father at some time prior to September 2006, when he quit high school. After the court issued the dissolution decree in early 2007, J.R. resided with Mother in Virginia for approximately five months, but he refused to enroll in school. He returned to Father‟s residence in Indiana at the end of May 2007. J.R. obtained his GED and graduated from the Indiana National Guard Youth Challenge Program on December 8, 2007, his eighteenth birthday. He then moved back to Lafayette to reside with Father. He also enrolled in Ivy Tech Community College.
Compare this with Carpenter where the child made approximately $21,000.00 and was having trouble paying for such things as a flat screen television.